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Abstract	
The	issue	of	the	lack	of	confidence	in	the	courts	provides	an	opportunity	for	us	to	consider	the	
question	of	how	sentencing	policy	is	formulated	and	whether	there	is	room	for	improvement	
in	the	process.	It	is	argued	in	this	paper	that	the	legitimacy	of	the	courts	and	public	satisfaction	
with	sentencing	can	both	be	enhanced	if	we	were	to	carefully	provide	for	the	inclusion	of	an	
informed	and	deliberating	public	into	policy	formulation.	Such	a	strategy	would	not	only	quell	
the	loose	and	ill‐defined	‘public	opinion’	that	characterises	the	tabloids;	it	would	also	enhance	
the	 transparency	and	 the	public	acceptance	of	policy.	The	paper	considers	 the	continuum	of	
possibilities	 for	 including	 the	 public	 from	 the	 gratuitous	 exploitation	 of	 the	 public	 voice	 by	
populists	 and	media	entrepreneurs	using	 top‐of‐the‐head	opinion	polls	 through	 to	 informed	
public	opinion,	public	consultation	process	and	ultimately	 the	democratisation	of	sentencing	
policy.	It	is	argued	that	this	continuum	can	be	seen	as	reflecting	both	the	amount	of	true	power	
given	to	the	public	voice	as	well	as	 the	amount	of	respect	given	to	public	 input.	Much	of	 the	
fear	of	public	inclusion	in	elite	circles	concerns	public	opinion	as	depicted	in	the	media	which	
is	 largely	 ‘public	 emotion’.	 It	 is	 argued	 that,	 when	 properly	 integrated,	 the	 inclusion	 of	 the	
public	voice	in	the	policy	formulation	process	will	have	the	same	salutary	effect	that	the	jury	
has	on	the	criminal	trial.		
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Introduction	
The	issue	of	the	lack	of	confidence	in	the	courts	seems	to	strike	a	chord	with	the	judiciary,	the	
public	 and	 politicians	 alike.	 Although	 there	 are	 many	 problems	 with	 the	 concept,	 as	 will	 be	
discussed	below,	it	is	important	at	the	outset	to	note	the	deep	resonance	of	the	issue.	Why	does	
it	 resound	 so	 deeply?	 One	 reason	 may	 be	 that	 it	 reflects	 an	 even	 greater	 crisis	 of	 trust	 in	
government	and	our	public	 institutions.	The	charge	 that	 the	courts	are	 ‘out	of	step’	may	sting	
because	 it	 has	 become	 a	 social	 and	 political	 fact,	 notwithstanding	 the	 widespread	 lack	 of	
knowledge	about	the	courts.	The	reality	for	most	is	that	the	courts	don’t	look	like	a	responsive,	
transparent	or	accountable	organisation.	This	may	well	be	because	 these	characteristics	were	
never	 seen	 as	 vital	 performance	 indicators	 for	 courts.	 They	 were,	 in	 previous	 times,	 more	
concerned	with	exhibiting	their	insularity	along	with,	or	supported	by,	the	sober	and	elite	status	
they	 enjoyed.	 But	 times	 have	 changed	 and	 the	 crisis	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 courts	 is	 perhaps	
reflective	 of	 the	 emerging	 view	 that	 the	 courts	 need	 to	 catch	 up.	 Authority	 remains	 the	 key	
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characteristic	but	 legitimacy	needs	 to	be	 found	 through	 those	more	 ascendant	 characteristics	
mentioned	above	such	as	accountability,	responsiveness	and	transparency.		
	
The	problem	of	 ‘face	validity’	or	legitimacy	can	be	traced	back	to	the	way	policies	that	govern	
the	 operation	 of	 the	 courts	 are	 developed.	 Conventional	 mechanisms	 that	 provide	 for	 the	
development	of	policy	by	the	elite	effectively	block	out	the	public	from	a	serious	role	in	policy	
formation.	 However	 in	 systematically	 blocking	 the	 public	 out	 of	 formal	 channels,	 the	 public	
‘voice’,	 at	 least	 as	 it	 is	 perceived	 and	 conceptualised	 by	 some	 actors,	 may	 exercise	 an	 even	
greater	influence.	Ironically	that	influence	may	further	distance	the	real	‘voice’	of	the	public.	The	
‘public	 opinion’	 that	 is	 being	 taken	 on	 board	 by	 populists	 is	 a	 kind	 of	media	 dominated	 and	
reactionary	caricature	and	bears	little	relation	to	more	considered	public	judgment.	It	is	argued	
in	 this	 paper	 that	 the	 public	 could	 be	 more	 effectively	 engaged	 in	 the	 policy	 development	
process.	Democratisation	provides	the	possibility	of	positive	engagement	of	the	public.	As	such	
it	is	argued	that	democratisation	sits	at	the	opposite	end	of	a	continuum	of	public	engagement	
from	the	dominant	political	strategy	of	populism.		
	
The	 paper	 begins	 with	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 informed	 public	 opinion	 and	 the	
contribution	that	‘deliberation’	makes	to	attitudes	to	sentencing.	It	will	be	argued	that	the	way	
sentencing	 policy	 is	 formulated	 can	 be	 reformed	 to	 provide	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 public	
accountability	and	transparency.	This	is	the	development	of	policy	through	the	inclusion	of	the	
public	voice.	At	this	point	I	would	expect	most	readers	from	the	judiciary	would	be	tensing	up	a	
little	so	I	would	hasten	to	add	that	the	argument	is	that,	when	properly	managed,	a	thoughtful	
and	genuine	 inclusion	of	 the	public	 voice	will	not	only	provide	 for	more	valid	and	acceptable	
sentencing	policy,	it	will	also	increase	the	authority	of	the	courts.		
	
Vox	populi?		
The	idea	that	the	voice	of	the	public	is	important	is	rarely	contested.	What	is	the	subject	of	fierce	
debate	is	what	can	be	taken	as	a	meaningful	or	accurate	representation	of	that	voice.		What	we	
know	is	that	the	tool	most	commonly	used,	the	opinion	poll,	is	a	very	unreliable	measure.	This	is	
because	the	responses	are	largely	dependent	on	the	context	and	question	asked1.	The	thoughts	
and	 positions	 adopted	 by	 a	 member	 of	 the	 public	 in	 relation	 to	 a	 question	 are	 invariably	 a	
reflection	of	 some	embedded	assumptions	 contained	within	 an	ongoing	discourse	around	 the	
topic.	 For	 example,	 if	 the	 questions	 relate	 to	 gun	 control,	 the	 death	 penalty	 or	 mandatory	
sentencing,	they	invite	the	statement	of	the	respondent’s	position	based	on	what	has	already	be	
gleaned	 about	 debate	 contained	 in	 the	 news	 media.	 Essentially	 the	 poll	 is	 asking	 about	 the	
respondent’s	 alignment	 with	 established	 socio‐political	 interests.	 Presenting	 this	 as	 simple	
‘opinion’	 without	 acknowledging	 predictable	 factors	 conditioning	 the	 response	 is	 either	
misleading	 or	 misinformed.	 However,	 the	 ‘top‐of‐the‐head’	 response	 will	 continue	 to	 be	
interesting	to	many.	This	is	not	necessarily	a	problem	as	long	as	there	is	a	clear	appreciation	of	
what	 is	being	measured.	This	kind	of	polling	 is	 interesting	precisely	because	 it	 is	 tapping	 into	
the	affective	or	feeling	level	rather	than	a	considered	judgment.	Because	of	this,	the	term	‘public	
opinion	poll’	should	really	be	renamed	‘public	emotion	poll’.		
	
Emotions	 of	 fear,	 anger	 and	 disgust	 are	 certainly	 easy	 to	 elicit	 on	 topics	 of	 crime	 and	
punishment2.	 However,	 to	 reduce	 public	 input	 to	 that	 of	 emotional	 reaction	 denies	 the	
legitimate	 and	 more	 pragmatic	 public	 interest	 in	 policy.	 Doob	 (2000)	 found	 that	 when	
conditions	 for	 rational	 problem	 solving	 are	 established	 it	 is	 the	 utilitarian	 aims	 that	
predominate.	So	the	problem	or	obstacle	for	including	the	public	voice	into	the	development	of	
policy	is	not	with	the	public	but	with	the	way	the	public	is	engaged.	When	engaged	as	decision	
makers	 rather	 than	 as	 robotic	 responders	 to	 polls,	 the	 more	 detailed	 and	 responsive	
preferences	of	the	public	can	be	isolated.	Doob	found,	unsurprisingly,	that,	when	policy	options	
were	posed	in	a	more	detailed	way	with	alternatives	and	consequences,	members	of	the	public	
respond	logically	in	the	same	way	we	would	expect	of	responsible	decision	makers	with	a	view	
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to	 optimising	 public	 benefits.	 The	 options	 chosen	 are	 those	 that	 would	 reduce	 victimisation	
most	and	lead	to	the	greatest	effect	in	terms	crime	reduction.		
	
Part	of	the	reason	polls	constructed	to	focus	on	practical	policy	decisions	are	not	conducted	or	
reported	on	is	that	they	are	not	newsworthy.	As	Katz	(1987)	notes,	the	media	consistently	select	
issues	 that	will	 raise	 conflict	 and	outrage.	 Staying	 focused	on	 the	 issue	of	whether	 the	public	
want	tougher	or	more	lenient	sentencing	and	whether	they	trust	or	don’t	trust	the	courts	will	
set	up	the	answers	to	fall	in	a	certain	direction	that	fulfil	media	needs.	They	reveal	an	interest	in	
the	emotional	dimensions	of	the	punishment	response	rather	than	what	the	public	might	want	
from	 policy.	 The	 top–of‐the‐head	 polls	 serve	 to	 keep	 the	 focus	 on	 expressive	 aspects	 of	
sentencing	because	they	invite	and	reflect	personal	values	or	emotions.	Such	a	focus	is	cued	to	
respondents	by	the	general,	and	often	directly	emotional,	nature	of	the	questions.	This	focusing	
on	 values	 and	 emotions	 plays	 directly	 into	 the	 central	 and	 pervading	 concerns	 of	 morality,	
responsibility	 and	 social	 defence.	 This	 is	 the	 reason	why	 crime	 is	 such	 an	 effective	 target	 for	
expressive	 emotions	 and	 politics.	 This	 is	 also	 why	 populism	 always	 presents	 as	 somewhat	
colourful	and	media	friendly.	A	populist	and	a	media	entrepreneur	both	feed	off	the	rich	field	of	
public	emotion.	This	leads	to	a	toxic	tryst	between	media	and	politics.	The	media	provides	the	
perfect	vehicle	for	the	populist	strategy	of	privileging	emotion	over	reason.	It	is	the	experience	
of	exuberance	which	comes	from	the	emotional	release	and	the	abandonment	of	reason.	Such	a	
release	feels	exhilarating	and	provides	ready‐made	product	for	the	tabloid	and	broadcast	media.	
Crime	 control	 is	 not	 interesting	 to	 populists	 because	 of	 a	 realistic	 threat	 of	 victimisation	 but	
rather	 because	 crime	 represents	 par	 excellence	 a	 range	 of	 other	 breakdowns	 in	 social	
institutions	 and	 relations	 through	 which	 individuals	 feel	 disempowered	 (see	 Tyler	 and	
Boeckmann	1997).	
	
So	we	need	to	acknowledge	a	split	here	between	the	interests	of	the	news	media	for	titillation	
and	emotional	stimulation	rather	than	rational	reflection	and	consideration	of	policy	options.	By	
continuing	 to	 focus	 only	 on	 the	 emotional	 or	 expressive	 dimensions	 of	 the	 punishment	
response,	media	and	political	entrepreneurs	are	able	to	exploit	‘the	voice	of	the	people’	for	their	
purposes.	 This	 is	 fundamentally	 disrespectful	 of	 the	 public	 and	 dismisses	 it	 as	 a	 viable	 force	
within	policy	development.	The	‘public’	as	an	entity	is	reduced	to	a	repository	of	raw	emotion.	
For	 this	 to	 change,	 the	 public	 does	 not	 need	 to	 be	 ‘informed’	 or	 ‘educated’;	 rather,	 the	
expectations	of	 the	role	of	 the	public	must	be	different.	 If	we	are	 interested	 in	 the	considered	
view	of	members	of	the	public	on	a	certain	policy	matter	and	we	are	prepared	to	take	the	time	
to	apprise	the	respondent	of	the	relevant	information	as	well	as	the	constraints	and	implications	
of	various	policy	options,	we	are	entering	a	different	enterprise.	This	takes	the	form	of	various	
shades	of	what	can	generally	be	described	as	‘informed	public	opinion’.	
		
Focusing	on	informed	public	opinion	essentially	changes	the	interest	from	opinion	as	a	kind	of	
‘word	 association	 test’	 to	 one	where	 the	 inquiry	 is	 focused	 on	what	 the	 view	 or	 judgment	 is	
when	the	respondent	has	some	knowledge	of	the	question	at	hand.	But	the	notion	of	informed	
public	opinion	generally	conveys	more	than	just	knowledge	or	 ‘information’.	Price	and	Neijins	
(1998)	 argue	 that	 there	 are	 three	 elements	 of	 the	 construct:	 information;	 deliberation;	 and	
responsibility‐taking.	 It	 is	 significant	 that	 two	 of	 Price	 and	 Neijins’	 criteria	 do	 not	 concern	
information	 but	 rather	 the	 orientation	 of	 the	 respondent	 to	 the	 task.	 These	 authors	 see	 the	
processing	 of	 the	 information	 through	question,	 debate	 and	 consideration	 as	 constituting	 the	
‘lion’s	 share’	 of	 what	 we	 mean	 when	 we	 talk	 about	 informed	 public	 opinion.	 The	 study	 of	
informed	public	opinion	therefore	leads	into	the	investigation	of	deliberation,	a	term	that	could	
be	seen	as	containing	the	core	process	of	informed	public	opinion3.	Informed	public	opinion	has	
been	incorporated	into	a	range	of	methods	designed	to	provide	a	meaningful	reflection	of	public	
views	 and	 responses	 to	 specific	 issues.	 These	 include	 planning	 cells,	 deliberative	 polling,	
consensus	 conferences,	 citizen	 panels	 and	 citizens’	 juries.	 Common	 to	 all	 these	 is	 the	
deliberative	component	where	participants	are	provided	with	information	about	the	issue	being	
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considered,	 are	 encouraged	 to	 discuss	 and	 challenge	 the	 information,	 and	 to	 consider	 each	
other’s	views	before	making	a	decision	or	recommendation	for	action.		
	
So	we	have	two	extremes	in	considering	potential	public	contributions	to	policy.	First,	the	top‐
of‐the‐head	 opinion	 reflected	 in	 the	 polls	we	 often	 see	 in	 newspapers;	 and	 second,	 the	 other	
deeply	 considered	 judgment	 contained	 within	 certain	 parameters	 and	 guided	 by	 elaborate	
‘rules’	of	evidence	and	the	like.	Naturally	these	serve	very	different	purposes	but	they	reflect	in	
some	 degree	 the	 evolution	 of	 our	 thinking	 about	 public	 attitude,	 from	 being	 just	 lightly	 held	
opinion	to	considered	judgment.	This	distinction	has	actually	been	appreciated	for	a	long	time	
but	has	yet	 to	become	widely	accepted	or	 incorporated	 into	policy	 formation	mechanisms.	 In	
the	 distinction	 Habermas	 (1989	 [1963]:	 219)	 makes	 between	 ‘mere	 opinion’	 and	 ‘public	
opinion’,	he	reveres	the	latter	as	not	simply	the	collection	of	individual	views	(‘mere	opinion’)	
but	rather	the	‘evolution’	of	such	individual	views	as	a	result	of	rational	critical	debate.	It	is	this	
process	of	debate	which	is	critical.	The	debating	process	requires	attention,	the	formulation	of	
positions	and	the	process	of	defending	the	position	formulated.	It	is	this	process	that	ultimately	
distinguishes	 what	 Habermas	 calls	 ‘mere	 opinion’	 from	 its	 alternative:	 considered	 judgment.	
The	process	 is	elevated	by	the	requirement	that	the	respondent	needs	to	weigh	up	competing	
goals,	sensitivities	and	constraints	to	arrive	at	a	responsible	decision.	Studies	of	public	attitudes	
have	 found	 this	 to	 be	 a	 crucial	 shift	 that	 informs	 and	 colours	 the	 outcome	 significantly.	 For	
example,	 Durham	 and	 colleagues	 (1996)	 found	 that	 support	 for	 the	 death	 penalty	 decreased	
substantially	 when	 respondents	 were	 placed	 in	 more	 of	 a	 decision‐making	 role	 by	 being	
presented	with	a	case	vignette	rather	than	with	a	simple	‘do	you	favour	...?’	question.		
	
The	crisis	of	confidence	or	legitimacy	in	the	courts	 is	exacerbated	by	superficial	polling	which	
appears	to	reinforce	and	amplify	public	discontent	with	the	courts.	Some	may	argue	that	there	
is	nothing	wrong	with	providing	punishment	which	may	be	expressive	but	not	based	on	rational	
consideration.	But	this	simply	puts	sentencing	in	the	position	of	the	domestic	cat	that	is	kicked	
as	an	outlet	for	frustrations	developed	elsewhere.	It	follows	that	if	we	are	to	have	a	rational	or	
responsible	sentencing	policy,	it	is	fundamental	that	the	expressive	value	of	punishment	needs	
to	be	named	as	such	so	that	it	is	not	confused	with	a	considered	or	accountable	policy.	Further,	
unless	we	 accept	 the	 notion	 that	 crime	 policy	 should	 simply	 serve	 as	 a	means	 for	 the	 public	
venting	of	 frustrations,	we	need	 to	 find	 a	way	of	 addressing	 the	 conflict	 between	 responsible	
policy	making	and	popular	punitiveness.		
	
The	systematic	and	responsible	engagement	of	the	public	may	provide	an	important	means	not	
only	 to	 provide	 greater	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 courts	 but	 also	 to	 protect	 them	 from	 political	
exploitation.	The	possibility	of	shutting	out	the	public	voice	or	placating	it	seems	to	be	the	least	
effective	as	well	as	the	least	creative	way	of	responding	to	the	crisis	of	confidence	in	the	courts.	
Effective	 engagement	offers	 a	much	more	 liberating	 and	 satisfying	prospect.	Ways	 to	 achieve	
effective	engagement	need	to	be	seriously	accelerated.	As	a	start	we	need	to	scope	out	the	issues	
regarding	engagement.		
	
Levels	of	public	engagement		
Ways	of	engaging	the	public	can	be	sketched	from	the	reactionary	to	the	progressive.	Although	
populist	 responses	 appear	 to	 privilege	 the	 public	 and	 provide	 the	 public	 a	 royal	 road	 to	 the	
articulation	of	policy,	this	view	is	flawed	because	of	what	is	accepted	as	a	representation	of	‘the	
public’.	What	are	privileged	are	the	perceived	public	emotions	rather	than	the	considered	view	
of	a	representative	sample	of	the	public.	The	position	is	akin	to	substituting	a	jury	verdict	with	
the	 kind	 of	 viewers’	 poll	 regularly	 incorporated	 into	 commercial	 news	 broadcasts.	 A	 true	
engagement	of	the	public	needs	to	start	from	a	position	of	respecting	and	valuing	public	input	
and	providing	the	conditions	where	public	judgment	can	be	accurately	captured	or	reflected.		
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In	 considering	 the	 role	 of	 the	 public	 in	 the	 reform	 of	 crime	 policy,	 Dzur	 (2012)	 argued	 that	
political	and	legal	theorists	have	offered	two	diametrically	opposed	responses.	On	the	one	hand,	
he	argued,	are	the	 insulations	who	seek	to	 isolate	and	protect	special	and	sensitive	aspects	of	
the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 such	 as	 sentencing	 from	 the	 vague	 and	 fierce	 winds	 of	 public	
influence.	This	position	is	reflected	in	the	suggestions	by	some	in	this	area	(for	example,	Roberts	
et	al.	2003)	for	the	development	of	‘institutional	buffers’	such	as	Sentencing	Advisory	Councils.	
However,	 Dzur	 details	 the	 flaws	 of	 the	 insulationist	 position4	 and	 concludes	 that	 it	 provides	
insufficient	protection	from	the	seductions	of	populism:		
	
...	the	insulationist	approach	to	penal	policy	is	fundamentally	flawed.	Given	these	
flaws,	it	should	be	seen	as	acceptable	only	if	it	is	better	than	the	alternative.	Thus	
far,	 the	 alternative	has	 been	 characterized	 as	 the	 status	quo	 condition	of	 penal	
populism,	but	this	is	not	the	only	available	choice.	(Dzur	2012:	118)		
	
The	contrasting	position	 is	 that,	 rather	 than	deflect	public	 influence,	we	should	systematically	
and	 effectively	 embrace	 it.	 The	 alternative,	 according	 to	 Dzur,	 is	 the	 ‘integrationist’	 position	
reflected	in	the	work	of	John	Braithwaite,	Nils	Christie	and	Howard	Zehr.	Dzur	argues	it	 is	the	
latter	approach	which	offers	much	greater	advantages	 in	moving	 forward	due	 to	 the	practical	
and	normative	problems	with	the	insulationsist	approach.		
	
While	much	of	the	work	Dzur	talks	about	in	regard	to	integrating	the	public	voice	involves	the	
restorative	justice	movement	and	juries,	he	acknowledges	that	the	level	of	public	 involvement	
with	these	aspects	of	the	operation	of	the	criminal	justice	system	are	relatively	small	and	often	
perfunctory.	The	real	possibilities	of	reform	lay	with	the	integration	of	the	public	voice	into	the	
development	of	policy.	There	have,	to	this	point,	only	been	the	fledgling	attempts	represented	
by	 one	 or	 two	 experiments	 with	 deliberative	 polling	 to	 speak	 of.	 The	 idea	 of	 systematically	
integrating	the	public	voice	into	the	formation	of	sentencing	policy	clearly	lays	some	distance	in	
the	future.		
	
As	 noted	 above,	 the	 alternative	ways	 of	 viewing	 attempts	 by	 authorities	 to	 situate	 the	public	
voice	can	be	placed	on	a	continuum	from	the	gratuitous	and	exploitative	(populism)	to	detailed,	
genuine	 and	 considerate.	 This	 continuum	 has	 been	 described	 in	 detail	 in	 an	 earlier	 work	
(Indermaur	2008).	Dzur’s	binary	distinction	between	 insulationists	and	 integrationists	can	be	
seen	 as	 looking	 at	 the	 two	 points	 on	 this	 continuum.	 Once	 we	 see	 how	 the	 struggle	 to	
incorporate	 and	 respond	 to	 public	 opinion	 falls	 on	 a	 continuum,	 we	 can	 begin	 to	 see	 the	
underlying	domain	reflected	in	the	continuum.	It	could	be	summarised	as	 ‘power’	–	the	actual	
power,	reflected	in	respect	given	to	the	public	voice.	This	essential	property	of	the	continuum	
could	be	 seen	as	 somewhat	akin	 to	 the	concept	of	 ‘dominion’	within	 the	 republican	 theory	of	
justice		
	
The	 integrationist	 approach	 is	 obviously	 consistent	 with	 the	 attempt	 to	 enhance	 public	
engagement	in	sentencing	policy.	It	aligns	with	the	movement	away	from	the	simple	tapping	of	
top‐of‐the‐head	 opinions	 and	 towards	 placing	 the	 public	 in	 a	 position	 of	 respect	 and	
responsibility.	 As	 a	 decision	 maker,	 the	 way	 individuals	 approach	 and	 respond	 to	 matters	
before	them	changes.	To	provide	a	meaningful	response,	the	respondent	needs	to	be	able	to	be	
briefed	on	important	and	relevant	information	and	be	able	to	access	more	information	that	they	
perceive	may	be	necessary	or	relevant	in	their	role	as	a	decision	maker.	In	much	the	same	way	
as	a	group	of	the	public	in	the	form	of	a	jury	are	fully	apprised	of	the	evidence	and	are	able	to	
seek	 more	 information	 when	 a	 group	 of	 the	 public	 are	 invited	 to	 have	 a	 role	 with	 some	
responsibility	 to	 establish	 parameters	 for	 sentencing	 policy,	 they	 need	 to	 be	 engaged	 in	 an	
interactive	way	when	it	comes	to	information5.		
	
The	problems	 seen	 in	 recent	 attempts	by	 governments	 to	 involve	 the	public	directly	 through	
polls,	referenda	or	consultations	have	been	discussed	elsewhere	(see	Indermaur	2008).	These	
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earlier	 attempts	 were	misinformed	 and	 dangerous.	 For	 example,	 the	 idea	 of	 including	 a	 one	
sentence	 question	 as	 a	 referendum	 at	 the	 national	 election	 in	 New	 Zealand	 provided	 broad	
authority	 for	 the	 most	 draconian	 sentencing	 measures.	 Further,	 the	 enthusiasm	 amongst	
government	 agencies	 large	 and	 small	 for	 ‘consultation’	 does	 little	 to	 provide	 for	 the	 realistic	
inclusion	of	the	public	voice.	Traditional/formal	government	consultation	processes	(‘respond	if	
you	want’)	appear	to	be	the	most	disingenuous	as	they	attempt	neither	representativeness	nor	
the	systematic	exploration	of	public	views	and	judgment.	Public	engagement	needs	to	be	built	
on	a	well	informed	and	constructed	plan.	It	is	not	something	that	can	be	conducted	cheaply	or	
quickly.	 Ideally	 these	 attempts	 to	 engage	 the	 public	 should	 be	 theoretically	 grounded	 and	
inspired.	 This	 would	mean	 that,	 rather	 than	 consultation	 ‘add‐ons’	 to	 an	 already	 established	
policy	 formulation	 process,	 the	 public	 input	 becomes	 an	 essential	 part	 of	 the	 process.	 The	
guiding	principles	of	democratisation	would	 then	replace	 the	existing	mantra	of	 ‘consultation’	
and	 the	 inherent	 understanding	 that	 it	 is	 an	 expendable	 side	 dish.	 We	 have	 seen	 various	
attempts	at	a	consultative	process	emerging	in	England	and	Wales	following	(and	including)	the	
Home	Office	(2001)	review	of	sentencing	(the	Halliday	Report).	However	these	attempts	have	
been	 criticised	 (see	 Indermaur	 2008)	 as	 they	 fell	 well	 short	 of	 what	 could	 be	 described	 as	
comprehensive	or	genuine.	Whilst	the	development	of	the	Sentencing	Advisory	Panel	provided	
for	independent	measures	of	public	attitude,	this	is	still	a	long	way	from	the	democratisation	of	
sentencing	policy6.		
	
Despite	 the	 stilted,	 patchy	 and	 limited	 attempts	 to	 include	 the	 public	 voice	 in	 the	 area	 of	
criminal	justice	policy,	democratisation	is	well	under	way	in	other	areas	social	policy7.	Dzur	and	
Mirchandani	 (2007)	see	 the	democratisation	process	as	occurring	 through	the	escalation	–	or	
rather	the	introduction	–	of	a	greater	sense	of	public	participation	and	dialogue.	These	authors	
point	to	the	restorative	 justice	movement	and	the	supporting	republican	theories	of	 justice	as	
offering	 a	 stark	 alternative	 to	 the	 passive	 democratic	 processes	 that	 lead	 to	 the	 dead	 end	 of	
populism.	The	power	of	populists	and	the	media	to	take	the	moral	high	ground	can	continue	for	
only	so	long	as	they	can	purport	to	speak	for	that	mystical	 figure	 ‘public	opinion’.	Such	claims	
can	be	cut	down	by	establishing	a	robust	process	of	public	engagement	that	truly	involves	the	
public	and	brings	them	into	the	key	decision	making	framework.		
	
Creating	vitality	in	policy		
The	 issue	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 courts	 needs	 to	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 larger	 context	 of	 changing	
perceptions	 and	 expectations	 of	 government	 and	 government	 institutions.	 The	 ground	 has	
shifted	and	old	certainties	and	assumptions	of	respect	 for	elites	no	longer	apply	(Ryan	2004).	
Along	with	the	advent	of	corporate	mission	statements,	freedom	of	information	and	continuous	
commissions	and	inquiries	into	all	arms	of	government	come	new	expectations	of	transparency	
and	 accountability.	 These	 expectations	 spread	 to	 the	 courts	 themselves,	 their	 actions	 (the	
sentencing)	and	the	policy	that	underpins	sentencing.	We	find	old	assumptions	that	elites	are	to	
be	respected	as	a	kind	of	benign	and	knowing	repository	of	wisdom	on	matters	concerning	the	
law	 are	 no	 longer	 sufficient.	 Sentencing	 policy,	 perhaps	 one	 of	 the	most	 vital	 and	 expressive	
forms	of	government	policy,	appears	 to	be	at	 the	 frontline	 for	criticism	but	reform	of	 the	way	
sentencing	 policy	 is	 formulated	 appears	 to	 be	 lagging	 well	 behind	 what	 is	 required.	 In	 her	
penetrating	 analysis	 of	 the	 issue	 of	 public	 confidence	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system	 and	 the	
surrounding	discourses,	Turner	(2008)	argues	that	the	concept	of	confidence	needs	to	be	more	
thoroughly	examined	and	a	clearer	emphasis	put	on	meaningful	engagement.	Turner	makes	the	
point	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 courts	 should	not	be	 taken	on	 face	 value.	Digging	
deeper	reveals	the	issues	discussed	above	which	largely	pertain	to	trust	and	the	compact	that	
does,	or	does	not,	exist	between	the	public	and	the	institution.		
	
As	in	other	areas	of	policy	that	have	attempted	to	provide	a	place	for	public	input,	it	is	regularly	
concluded	 that,	unless	 the	effort	 is	 genuine	and	carefully	managed,	 it	 is	 likely	 to	backfire	and	
create	even	greater	cynicism.	The	first	question,	then,	is:	‘are	we	genuine?’	Do	we	really	want	to	
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provide	a	meaningful	place	for	the	public	voice	in	the	development	of	sentencing	policy?	Many	
of	 the	 attempts	 to	 include	 the	 public	 in	 criminal	 justice	 policy	 making	 thus	 far	 appear	 half	
hearted.	As	 Johnstone	(2000)	notes,	many	of	 the	vaunted	public	consultations	appear	 to	have	
been	largely	designed	simply	to	placate	the	public.		
	
A	 key	 question	 for	 those	 interested	 in	 democratisation	 is	 where	 public	 input	 is	 best	 placed.	
Some	systematic	thinking	and	planning	here	would	go	a	long	way	to	provide	for	reasoned	public	
input.	Incorporating	compartmentalised	and	sequential	stages	could	be	useful.	For	example,	at	
the	initial	stages,	an	examination	of	public	preferences	around	overarching	goals,	principles	and	
balancing	priorities	could	be	undertaken8.	Such	considerations	have	been	undertaken	by	many	
of	 the	 formal	 reviews	 of	 sentencing	 conducted	 in	 most	 western	 democracies	 over	 the	 past	
quarter	 century.	 However,	 these	 have	 rarely	 systematically	 tapped	 public	 preferences.	
Following	on	from	the	general	level,	there	could	be	an	inquiry	into	managing	different	types	of	
sentencing	 dilemmas.	 An	 interesting	 challenge	 is	 to	 genuinely	 inquire	 how	 sense	 is	 made	 of	
different	 offence/offender	 combinations.	We	 know	 from	various	 research	 into	 public	 opinion	
(for	example,	Rex	2002)	that	the	public	think	in	terms	of	offence/offender	combinations.	One	of	
the	possibilities	 is	 to	explore	how	public	conceptualisations	might	be	translated	 into	different	
‘pathways’	 of	 justice	 in	 a	 way	 outlined	 by	 Freiberg	 (2002).	 This	 might	 make	 the	 practice	 of	
sentencing	fit	better	with	how	individuals	think	about	sentencing.	Not	only	might	this	increase	
legitimacy,	it	will	aid	in	the	communication	of	the	intent	and	process	of	sentencing.		
	
What	 is	 impractical	 and	 unnecessary	 in	 regard	 to	 public	 engagement	 is	 for	 the	 public	 to	 be	
engaged	 in	operational	and	administrative	matters.	 It	 is	at	 the	 level	of	overarching	policy	and	
direction	that	public	engagement	is	not	only	most	meaningful	but	ultimately	(for	the	public	and	
the	 courts)	 likely	 to	 be	 most	 satisfying.	 The	 technical	 detail	 of	 how	 to	 give	 effect	 to	 these	
principles	is	more	the	province	of	‘legal	technicians’	–	the	administrators	of	the	criminal	justice	
system	who	have	the	task	of	ensuring	that	the	administration	of	criminal	justice	is	fair	and	gives	
effect	to	the	legislated	aims	and	principles.	
	
A	legitimate	public	involvement	would	clearly	seek	to	incorporate	and	harness	the	views	of	’Joe	
public’,	 the	 ordinary	 everyday	 citizen	 that	 does	 not	 have	 a	 particular	 axe	 to	 grind	 but	 is	
concerned	with	the	things	most	citizens	can	be	thought	to	be	concerned	with	–	public	safety	and	
the	 integrity	 and	 fairness	 of	 the	 criminal	 justice	 system.	 What	 we	 are	 seeking	 here	 is	 the	
recruitment	and	engagement	of	a	representative	sample	which	would	be	willing	to	become	at	
least	modestly	 informed	 about	 some	 relevant	 facts	 about	 crime	 and	 the	possible	 functions	 of	
punishment.	Following	this,	there	has	to	be	room	for	some	debating	process	where	views	can	be	
put	forward,	tested,	responded	to,	and	so	on	This	process	is	necessary	to	test	the	robustness	of	
certain	views	and	explore	what	is	essential	and	what	is	more	peripheral	or	expendable	in	public	
wishes	 concerning	 sentencing	 The	 debating	 process	 also	 tests	 out	 how	 public	 views	 can	
respond	and	change	with	the	addition	of	information	–	like	the	technical	likelihood	of	changing	
behaviour,	 producing	more	 public	 safety,	 the	 relative	 costs	 of	 certain	 proposals	 and	 perhaps	
some	 of	 the	 unanticipated	 consequences.	 The	 process	 parallels	 the	 ‘public	 sphere’	 processes	
introduced	and	discussed	by	Habermas.	As	Dzur	and	Mirchandani	(2007:	161)	summarise:		
	
...	 public	 sphere	 process	 involve[s]	 individuals	who	 interact	 equally	 in	 rational,	
open	and	ongoing	debate	to	discuss	and	ultimately	agree	upon	public	policies	like	
punishment.	By	 rational	debate	Habermas	means	a	process	 already	 inherent	 in	
basic	language	use	where	people	make	claims,	give	reasons	for	their	claims	and,	
given	adequate	time,	reach	consensus	or	agreement.	A	rational	debate	on	public	
policy	involves	articulating,	explaining	or	justifying	positions.		
	
From	this	process	of	providing	information	and	debate,	we	can	arrive	at	a	set	of	principles	and	
priorities.	 These	 can	 be	 integrated	 into	 a	 cogent	 policy	 framework	 through	 mechanisms	
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developed	 in	 policy	 bureaux	 and	ultimately	 integrated	 in	 a	 practical	way	 into	 legislation	 that	
governs	sentencing	practice.		
	
Creating	 a	 context	 of	 decision	 making	 whereby	 the	 responsibility	 for	 policy	 rests	 with	 the	
individual	 will	 likely	 reduce	 many	 participants’	 tendency	 to	 base	 their	 responses	 on	 pure	
emotion.	 The	 same	 sobering	 process	 can	 be	 observed	 in	 the	 jury	 where	 coming	 to	 a	 verdict	
places	great	responsibility	on	members	of	a	jury.	In	the	same	way	we	expect	ordinary	citizens	to	
rise	to	the	occasion	as	members	of	a	 jury,	we	can	expect	members	of	a	citizen	policy	panel	 to	
rise	to	the	occasion	and	contribute	honestly	and	for	the	benefit	of	the	community.	The	key	issue	
is	 not	 information	 but	 the	 role	 we	 expect	 the	 respondent	 to	 play	 and	 how	 we	 convey	 that	
expectation	 through	 how	 the	 respondent	 is	 approached.	 Indermaur	 and	 colleagues	 (2012)	
concluded	 from	 their	 analysis	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 information	 and	 deliberation	 on	 short	 form	
opinion	surveys	that,	rather	than	the	technical	information,	it	was	the	changed	task	demands	or	
postures	that	made	the	difference	in	terms	of	reduced	punitiveness	and	increased	openness	to	
alternative	 to	 imprisonment.	 Information	 is	 still	 obviously	 vital	 but	 now	 this	 is	 seen	 as	
something	provided	to	help	individuals	with	their	decision	making.	Again,	the	model	of	the	jury	
can	guide	us	in	how	to	appreciate	and	value	the	judgment	of	the	public	and	incorporate	it	into	
the	process	with	real	meaning.		
	
There	 is	 considerable	 experience	 on	 how	 to	 provide	 for	 public	 participation	 in	 developing	
policy,	including	complex	areas	of	social	policy9.	This	points	to	the	necessity	of	a	multi‐layered	
strategy	 where	 policy	 questions	 are	 carefully	 formulated	 prior	 to	 any	 attempt	 at	 formally	
engaging	 the	 public.	 In	 the	 preparation	 stage,	 components	 or	 aspects	 of	 sentencing	 policy,	
where	 it	 is	valuable	 to	obtain	public	 input,	need	to	be	 identified	by	a	suitably	qualified	group	
and	then	questions	developed	where	public	preferences	or	responses	are	relevant.	This	 initial	
stage	 could	 involve	 key	 groups	 of	 stakeholders,	 as	 has	 been	 the	 practice	 elsewhere,	 to	 help	
frame	relevant	questions	for	the	public	debate	(see	Renn	et	al.	1993).	This	stage	also	 involves	
developing	a	range	of	policy	positions	and	questions.	Policy	options	need	to	be	formulated	and	
embellished	with	 vital	 information	 such	 as	 cost	 benefit	 analyses	 and	 other	 considerations	 to	
allow	meaningful	and	realistic	policy	options	to	be	posed	in	an	appropriate	way	to	a	sample	of	
the	public.		
	
The	idea	of	deliberative	polling	or	a	citizen	jury	on	sentencing	being	developed	and	conducted	
by	 a	 suitably	 qualified	 and	 independent	 body	 has	 significant	 advantages.	 Thus	 far	 the	 most	
widely	 cited	deliberative	 polling	 exercise	 in	 regard	 to	 criminal	 justice	was	 actually	 organised	
and	conducted	by	a	television	station.	Independent	researchers	are	unlikely	to	be	able	to	have	
the	infrastructure	or	funding	to	be	able	to	conduct	the	complex	and	expensive	exercise	required.	
The	endeavour	clearly	needs	to	be	government	funded	but	also	needs	to	be	kept	at	arm’s	length	
from	 current	 governments.	 The	 ideal	 authority	 exists	 in	 some	 jurisdictions	 in	 the	 form	 of	
Sentencing	 Advisory	 Councils.	 Indeed,	 as	 noted	 earlier,	 the	 Sentencing	 Advisory	 Panel	 in	
England	and	Wales	 conducted	a	number	of	 specific	 and	detailed	 inquiries	 into	public	opinion	
regarding	 some	 difficult	 sentencing	 policy	 dilemmas.	 In	 Australia,	 the	 Victorian	 Sentencing	
Advisory	Council	has	conducted	a	series	of	inquiries	and	sponsored	research	into	public	opinion	
on	 sentencing	 matters.	 In	 New	 South	 Wales,	 the	 Sentencing	 Advisory	 Council	 has	 funded	
research	conducted	by	the	NSW	Bureau	of	Crime	Statistics	and	Research	into	confidence	in	the	
courts.	These	are	all	positive	starts	and	augur	well	for	the	future	but	they	remain	fixed	to	the	old	
notion	of	using	traditional	methods	of	gauging	public	opinion.	There	is	clearly	more	than	can	be	
done	and	needs	to	be	done	as	suggested	above.	
	
There	 may	 be	 a	 belief	 amongst	 some	 in	 the	 judiciary	 and	 academia	 that	 sentencing	 is	 too	
important	 to	 be	 entrusted	 to	 the	 public	 but	 this	 position	 (insulationism	 in	 Dzur’s	 analysis)	
essentially	 turns	 the	 democratic	 process	 on	 its	 head;	 ultimately	 it	 is	 the	 public	 through	 its	
elected	representatives	who	will	determine	the	guiding	purposes	of	the	sentencing	and	the	level	
of	punishment	that	should	be	assigned	to	various	offences.	It	is	perhaps	the	perceived	attempt	
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by	elites	to	retain	power	over	the	processes	and	priorities	that	govern	sentencing	that	underlies	
much	of	the	public	outrage.	The	public	are	entitled	to	feel	that	the	compass	used	to	reflect	the	
careful	balancing	of	safety,	justice	and	morality	belongs	to	the	community.			
	
Conclusion		
This	 paper	 began	 with	 the	 question	 of	 why	 the	 issue	 of	 confidence	 in	 the	 courts	 is	 widely	
recognised	as	one	that	should	be	addressed	and	needs	to	be	addressed.	The	key	argument	here	
is	that	the	issue	pertains	to	the	ever	growing	lack	of	legitimacy	of	the	courts.	This	is	not	because	
the	 courts	 are	 doing	 anything	 differently	 or	 that	 they	 have	 failed	 to	 adhere	 to	 their	 own	
expectations.	Rather	 it	 is	because	the	policy	that	governs	the	courts	and	that	the	courts	enact,	
principally	 sentencing	policy,	 is	not	 seen	 as	 transparent	or	publicly	 accountable.	The	 crisis	of	
confidence	is	in	essence	a	crisis	of	legitimacy.	The	crisis	will	remain	until	sentencing	policy	can	
open	up	to	wider	influence,	in	particular	some	form	of	public	input.	The	sense	of	aloofness	and	
elite	control	will	continue	to	hamper	any	effort	by	governments	of	judiciary	to	 ‘sell’	the	policy	
unless	some	form	of	public	input	has	been	integrated	into	the	formulation	of	policy.		
	
The	 value	 of	 public	 engagement	 is	 principally	 to	 add	 legitimacy	 to	 the	 courts.	 However	 the	
process	of	public	engagement	will	do	more.	It	will	add	value	to	the	communicative	functions	of	
the	 court.	 The	 process	 of	 articulating	 and	 explaining	 policy	 options	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 a	 salutary	
discipline	and	enhance	the	public	appreciation	of	both	policy	and	practice.	Juries	have	provided	
a	great	deal	of	legitimacy	to	criminal	trials	and	to	a	greater	or	lesser	extent	fireproofed	verdicts	
from	public	criticism.	The	jury	system	has	also	been	instrumental	in	shaping	legal	process.	This	
form	of	public	engagement	has	not	had	 the	effect	of	wrestling	control	of	 the	criminal	process	
away	 from	the	 judiciary.	 Indeed	this	 form	of	engagement	adds	 legitimacy	while	strengthening	
the	 process	 and	 ultimately	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 courts.	 A	 corresponding	 form	 of	 public	
engagement	 could	 provide	 the	 same	 service	 to	 sentencing	 policy	 and	 ultimately	 enhance	 the	
legitimacy	of	that	policy	and	the	confidence	people	have	in	the	courts.		
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1	 A	 number	 of	 authoritative	 sources	 provide	 detail	 on	 the	 picture	 of	 public	 opinion,	 the	 media	 and	 sentencing	
practice	 referred	 to	here.	Roberts	 and	Stalans	 (1997)	provide	 the	most	detail	 and	 complete	 reference.	A	more	
accessible	reference	is	Roberts	(1992)	or	Cullen	et	al.	(2000).	In	regard	to	the	media	and	political	exploitation	of	
public	concerns,	see	Roberts	et	al.	(2003)	or	Indermaur	and	Hough	(2002).		
2		 The	exploration	of	public	emotions	around	crime	and	sentencing	has	had	a	long	history	and	has	had	something	of	
a	resurgence	of	interest	recently.	See	Karstedt	(2002)	for	a	discussion	of	the	emotionalisation	of	the	law,	Johnson	
(2009)	 for	 a	 review	of	 the	 role	of	 anger	 in	public	 attitudes.	 See	 Sargent	 (2004)	 for	 an	 examination	about	how	
individual	 preferences	 to	 use	 emotion	 in	 understanding	 behaviour	 can	 predict	 punitiveneness	 and	 Frieberg	
(2001)	 for	 an	 appeal	 to	policy	makers	 to	 consider	 the	 emotional	dimension	or	public	 opinion	as	 an	 important	
issue	to	consider	when	shaping	and	presenting	criminal	justice	policy.				
3		 See	Barabas	(2004)	for	an	investigation	of	how	the	term	‘deliberation’	has	evolved	and	what	the	active	processes	
involved	are.		
4		 The	key	arguments	Dzur	mounts	against	insulationism	are	that	‘...	it	depends	upon	a	a	political	condition	...	that	no	
longer	holds	 in	 the	United	Kingdom	or	 the	United	States	namely	 trust	 in	experts	and	professionals	 in	 criminal	
justice’	 (p.	117).	Second,	Dzur	argues	 that	 the	 idea	of	 true	 independence	 is	questionable	as	 the	selection	of	 the	
chosen	 few	would	be	 subject	 to	 political	 pressures.	 Finally,	 Dzur	 argues	 the	 expert	 panel	 system	does	 little	 to	
protect	the	political	masters	from	criticism	once	a	sensational	case	draws	attention	to	sentencing.			
5		 Warner	and	colleagues	(2011)	recently	report	on	a	study	examining	how	the	views	of	 jury	members	supported	
the	sentencing	of	the	judge	at	the	trial	they	were	involved	in	and	the	information	and	deliberation	on	the	judges’	
reasons	for	sentencing	generally	had	a	moderating	influence	on	their	views	about	sentencing	in	general.			
6		 The	Sentencing	Advisory	Panel	greatly	increased	the	quality	of	the	measurement	of	public	attitude	and	developed	
specific	inquiries	into	public	attitude	in	regard	to	certain	key	areas	of	sentencing	reform	(for	example	Roberts	et	
al.	2009).				The	Sentencing	Advisory	Panel	was	superseded	along	with	the	Sentencing	Guidelines	Council	in	2010	
by	the	newly	established	Sentencing	Council	for	England	and	Wales.		
7		 For	an	overview	see	Goodwin	and	Dryzek	(2006),	Dryzek	(2000),	Bessette	(1994)	and	Gastil	and	Levine	(2005).		
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8					On	this	topic	see	Roberts	et	al.	(2009)	
9		 For	example	see:	Catt	and	Murphy	(2003),	Goodwin	and	Dryzek	(2006)	Ackerman	et	al.	(2004)	Smith	and	Wales	
(2000),	Shand	and	Arnberg	 (1996),	Bishop	and	Davis	 (2002),	Hendricks	 (2002),	Einsiedel	and	Eastlick	 (2000),	
Pratchett	(1999);	Fischer	(1993),	Carpini	et	al.	(2004)	and	Rowe	and	Frewer	(2005).	
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